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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TAMARA HOWARD 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 960147-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for 
Welfare Fraud, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-8-1201, et. seq. (1995 & Supp. 1996) (a copy of the 
judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable William B. Bohling, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the state's failure to present legally 
sufficient evidence to establish that Tamara Howard ("Howard") 
committed welfare fraud should have resulted in the dismissal of 
the charge. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A conviction will be reversed if the 
evidence is sufficiently "inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
1 
convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit to 
the jury Howard's proposed instruction defining reasonable doubt. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Determining the propriety of a jury 
instruction presents a question of law" which is reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness. State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 
363 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Smoot, No. 950550 
(Utah Ct. App. June 20, 1996). Deficient reasonable doubt 
instructions can never be harmless. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed. 2d 182 (1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
After the state presented its case-in-chief, counsel for 
Howard asked the trial court to dismiss the charge against Howard 
on the basis that the state failed to present sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction. The trial court denied Howard's motion. 
Record on Appeal ("R.") at 519-522. 
In addition, during trial the defense requested that 
Howard's proposed jury instruction defining the reasonable doubt 
standard be submitted to the jury. A copy of Howard's proposed 
instruction is attached hereto as Addendum B. (R. 157-58.) The 
trial court denied Howard's request and submitted its own 
instruction defining the standard to the jury. (R. 533-535.) A 
copy of the trial court's instructions is attached hereto as 
Addendum C. (R. 96.) 
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RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will be 
determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1201, et. sea. (1995 & Supp. 
1996) -- Public Assistance Fraud Act. 
Utah Const, art. I, sec. 7. 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
Howard was charged by Information on June 19, 1995, with 
Welfare Fraud, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-8-1201, et. seq. (1995 & Supp. 1996). (R. 8-10.) 
During the three-day jury trial, the trial court rejected a jury 
instruction proposed by the defense, and at the conclusion of the 
state's case, Howard's counsel made a motion to dismiss on the 
basis that the state failed to present evidence sufficient to 
support a conviction. (R. 519-22.) The trial court denied 
Howard's motion, the jury found her guilty of welfare fraud, and 
the trial court sentenced her to prison for an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years. (R. 179-
80.) The trial court stayed the prison term and ordered Howard 
by amended judgment to serve eight days in the county jail 
followed by probation and to pay restitution. (Id.; 192-92.) 
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Howard appeals from the final judgment. (R. 182-83.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state presented evidence at trial that Howard applied 
for welfare benefits on December 13, 1993. (R. 290-295; State's 
Exhibit 1 (hereinafter "Ex. 1").) At that time, she completed an 
application for financial assistance and indicated she wanted 
more information on the "Self-Sufficiency" program. (Ex. 1.) 
Howard was unemployed. (R. 607-08.) Thus, at the time Howard 
applied for benefits, the section on the application form 
concerning employment was left blank. (Ex. 1 at p. 6.) 
On January 5, 1994, a case worker from the Utah Department 
of Human Services (the "Department") discussed Howard's December 
13 application with her. (R. 295-97.) The case worker testified 
that she went over the employment section with Howard. (R. 297.) 
She also testified that when applicants inform her they have not 
been working, she "put [s] a big red circle with a slash through 
it" on the application. (R. 297-98.) Such a mark was made on 
Howard's December 13 application. (Ex. 1 at p. 6.) The case 
worker stated that she "would" have made that mark in response to 
information she received from Howard; however, she could not 
recall specifically how she discussed portions of the application 
with Howard. (R. 298; 328-29; Ex.1 at p. 6.) 
The case worker also testified that while she and Howard 
were reviewing forms, Howard "indicate[d] she wanted to find a 
job." (R. 298-99.) That "indication" is reflected in the 
December 13 application where Howard requested additional 
4 
information about the "Self-Sufficiency" program. (Ex. 1 at 
p.3.) The case worker did not discuss employment opportunities 
or services with Howard. Rather, she referred Howard to the 
program. (R. 298-99.) 
The application also contained "long and wordy" legal 
provisions, which the case worker did not read to or review with 
Howard. (R. 301-05; 332-33.) Howard's signature was at the 
bottom of the application below a provision which stated that she 
read or had the document read to her and understood the 
statements and that the information provided in connection with 
the application was true. (R. 3 04-05; Ex. 1.) 
During the application process, the case worker reviewed 
with Howard approximately seven or eight forms, including a 
"Changes You Must Report" form, which Howard signed. (R. 310-12; 
327; State's Exhibit 3 (hereinafter "Ex. 3").) It required a 
benefits recipient to report changes in income source and changes 
of "more than $25 in gross income." (Id.) 
During the interview, Howard did not reveal anything to the 
case worker about outside income or employment. (R. 313.) 
Howard's original case worker was assigned to her case for 
approximately three months. (R. 317-18.) During that initial 
three-month period, Howard's case worker handled approximately 
130-140 additional and separate benefits cases. (R. 318-19.) If 
a client wanted to reach one of ten case workers on the team, 
he/she could leave a message on an answering machine, and a 
supervisor in the office was supposed to post the message on a 
5 
regular slip of message paper for the appropriate case worker. 
(R. 319-20.) 
In March 1994, Howard's case was transferred to a second 
case worker, who testified that she received a recertification 
form ("Recertification Form") updating Howard's application 
information. (R. 349-352; State's Exhibit 4 (hereinafter "Ex. 
4).) One section of the Recertification Form asked whether 
anyone in recipient's household had changed employment in the 
past four months and the immediately succeeding section asked for 
employment information. (R. 3 52-53; Ex. 4 at pp. 4-5.) Both 
sections were left blank on Howard's form. (Ex. 4 at pp. 4-5.) 
The Recertification Form contained Howard's signature and was 
dated March 1994. (Ex. 4; R. 355.) 
The second case worker also testified that in April 1994, 
she received a Change Report Form indicating a change of 
residence for Howard. (R. 356-58; State's Exhibit 5 (hereinafter 
"Ex. 5").) Although the form requested changes in income of 
"more than $25," no change was reported. (R. 359-60; Ex. 5.) 
The Change Report Form also contained a "fraud warning for food 
stamp recipients." (R. 361; Ex. 5 at p. 2.) 
The second case worker admitted that the change form 
documents were ambiguous with respect to what was required of 
recipients in reporting changes in income. (R. 3 72-75.) 
Further, it was not clear whether the phrase, "more than $25," 
referred to income received per day, week, month, pay period, or 
other. (Id.) She also admitted that she never met with Howard, 
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and thus, never explained to Howard the Department's expectations 
of recipients with respect to reporting changes in income. (R. 
369-70.) The second case worker testified that she relied on the 
representations set forth in the documents received in March and 
April 1994 in making recommendations and calculations with 
respect to the benefits provided to Howard. (R. 362-63.) 
In April 1994, Howard's file was transferred to another 
Department office and a third case worker (R. 3 82-83), who 
testified that most of her dealings with Howard were over the 
telephone, but that she arranged to meet with Howard face-to-
face. (R. 383-84; 387-88.) Prior to the meeting, Howard tele-
phoned the case worker to state she recently had medical surgery 
and was not feeling well. (R. 387-88.) Thus, the third case 
worker sent a Recertification Form to Howard, which was returned 
in December 1994 with Howard's signature. (R. 385-86; State's 
Exhibit 6 (hereinafter "Ex. 6").) Again, the employment sec-
tions, as well as sections concerning physical and mental 
disabilities and other sections, were left blank. (R. 389-90; 
413-15; Ex. 6.) The third case worker acknowledged that it was 
not necessary for recipients to complete each section of the 
Recertification Form, and in fact the case worker did not have an 
expectation that the sections concerning physical disabilities or 
medical expenses should be completed even though the case worker 
was aware through her telephone conversations with Howard that 
Howard was temporarily disabled as a result of a recent surgery. 
(R. 413-15.) The case worker also acknowledged that if there was 
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no change in employment, the recipient was not expected to 
complete the employment sections of the Recertification Forms. 
(R. 417-19.) 
The third case worker testified that she was never informed 
that Howard was employed, and relied on the representations set 
forth in the Recertification Form and other application papers to 
make determinations concerning benefits. (R. 387.) In December 
1994, the third case worker learned through a routine computer 
check that Howard had been employed since December 29, 1993. (R. 
404-09.) 
In February 1995, Howard met the third case worker in person 
and completed another Recertification Form. (R. 3 93-94; State's 
Exhibit 6a.) Howard indicated no change in employment. (R. 397-
403; 419.) All three case workers testified that even if a 
benefits recipient is employed, he/she may still be eligible to 
receive benefits. (R. 325-26; 372-75; 419-20; 502-03.) 
A Far West Consulting employee testified that Howard began 
full-time employment with that company on December 29, 1993, as a 
housekeeper and received wages for each pay period in 1994. (R. 
433-438; State's Exhibit 7.) In addition, Howard's daughter was 
employed with the company from April 1994 to December 1994. (R. 
447-49; State's Exhibit 7c.) 
An employee from the Utah Bureau of Investigations and 
Collections testified that he investigated allegations that 
Howard engaged in welfare fraud. (R. 460; 463.) He outlined the 
benefits provided to Howard from January 1994 to December 1994, 
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and testified that a computer calculated that she received 
benefits overpayment during that period in the amount of 
$11,092.64. (R. 491.) 
Witnesses for the defense testified that Howard suffers from 
learning disabilities, is hearing impaired, needs assistance in 
reading and completing forms and paper work, and is able to read 
at a second or third grade level. (R. 511; 513-14; 540; 552-58; 
565; 588-89; 592-94; 602-04; 619.) In addition, Howard testified 
that during the 1993 Christmas-holiday season, she called and 
left a message on the Department answering machine that she had 
been hired to work at Far West for $4.25 per hour. (R. 607-611; 
544-47.) Howard always believed that as a result of having made 
that call, she sufficiently notified the Department of the 
changes in her employment situation. (R. 613-15; 619-620.) 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury was instructed as 
follows: 
Before you can convict the defendant, Tamara 
Howard, of the crime of Welfare Fraud, a Second Degree 
felony, you must find that the State has proven each of 
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or between January 1, 19 94, and December 
31, 1994, the defendant, Tamara Howard, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah; 
2. knowingly or intentionally by false statement, 
misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent 
means; 
3. failed to disclose any material fact or change 
in circumstances; 
4. for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to 
receive public assistance to which she was not 
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entitled, or in an amount larger than that to which she 
was entitled; 
5. and the value of benefits fraudulently 
obtained exceeded $5,000.00. 
If you find that the evidence has failed to 
establish each of [] these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you 
find that the evidence has established each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
(R. 103.) In addition, over objections from the defense, the 
trial court submitted to the jury a stock instruction defining 
the reasonable doubt standard and rejected an instruction 
proposed by the defense. (R. 533-535.) 
The jury found Howard guilty of welfare fraud. (R. 81.) 
The trial court sentenced her to prison (R. 179-80), then stayed 
the prison term, and ordered Howard to serve eight days in the 
county jail followed by probation and to pay restitution. (Id.; 
192-93.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial failed to show that Howard 
had the requisite mental culpability to support the conviction. 
The state presented evidence that the Department was unaware that 
Howard was employed during the time she received benefits, and 
documents submitted by Howard did not reflect the change in her 
employment. Those facts alone are insufficient to prove in-
tentional, knowing, or reckless conduct with an illegal purpose. 
The reasonable doubt instruction used by the trial court was 
circular and unhelpful, and trivialized the state's burden of 
proof in violation of the due process clauses of the state and 
10 
federal constitutions. On the other hand, the instruction offer-
ed by Howard was straight forward and clear. The trial court 
erred in refusing to submit Howard's instruction to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF WELFARE FRAUD. 
A. THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW THAT HOWARD 
INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY, OR RECKLESSLY FAILED TO 
DISCLOSE A CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT STATUS. 
In this matter, the jury was charged with determining 
whether the state had met its burden of proving the following 
elements of welfare fraud beyond a reasonable doubt: That Howard 
"knowingly or intentionally by false statement, misrepresenta-
tion, impersonation, or other fraudulent means; [] failed to 
disclose any material fact or change in circumstances; [] for the 
purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive public assistance 
to which she was not entitled, or in an amount larger than that 
to which she was entitled." (R. 103.J1 The marshalled evidence 
reflects the following: 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1205 provides that a person is guilty of 
public assistance fraud if she "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
commits" any of the enumerated acts, including: 
* * * 
(3) . . . receives an unauthorized payment as a result 
of acts described in this section; 
(4) . . . receives benefits after failing to comply 
with any applicable requirement in Section[] 76-8-1203 [which 
requires disclosure of "each fact that may materially affect 
the determination of [her] eligibility to receive public 
assistance," including employment and income], . .; [and] 
* * * 
(11) . . . obtains an overpayment by violation of 
Section 76-8-1203 . . . . 
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When Howard prepared the December 13 application for 
benefits, she was unemployed (R. 607-08); 
When the first case worker reviewed the December 13 
application and other forms with Howard in January 
1994, Howard was employed but did not disclose that 
fact to the case worker at that time (R. 297-305; 328-
29; 433-38); 
Howard did not disclose in Recertification and change 
forms any change in employment circumstances in 1994 
while receiving welfare benefits (R. 352-58; 385-90; 
413-15; Ex. 4; Ex. 5; Ex. 6); 
Howard was required to report changes in income and 
employment status to the Department (Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-1203 (1) (c) and (d) (1995)); and 
The Department provided Howard with food stamps and 
financial and medical benefits in 1994 based on a 
representation that she was unemployed (R. 3 87; 3 62-
63) . 
The evidence also reflects that once a recipient notifies the 
Department of a change concerning employment, the recipient is 
not required to "re"-notify the Department of such change in 
succeeding Recertification Forms or change papers. (R. 3 72-75; 
413-19.) 
In this case, Howard testified that prior to receiving 
benefits from the Department and after completing the December 13 
application, she left a telephone message on an answering machine 
with the Department that she was employed and earning $4.25 per 
hour. (R. 607-11; 544-47.) The state did not discredit Howard 
with evidence that the supervisor, who would have been required 
to post Howard's message, did not get the message. In addition, 
the state presented no evidence to support a determination that 
Howard knew or should have known that the Department somehow did 
not receive her message concerning the change in employment 
12 
status. 
The state also failed to prove that Howard knew or should 
have known she was receiving undeserved benefits, or that Howard 
should have known the amount in benefits she was entitled to 
receive at any given time. Rather, the state's witnesses 
testified that employed applicants may be eligible to receive 
benefits. (R. 325-26; 419-20; 502-03.) Thus, it was reasonable 
for Howard to believe that although she was employed, she was 
entitled to the benefits she received. Howard's conduct 
constituted negligence at best and did not warrant a criminal 
conviction. 
The direct and circumstantial evidence and inferences 
marshalled in favor of the verdict fail to show that Howard acted 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly and with an illegal 
purpose. (R. 103); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1205 and 76-8-1203 
(1995); see Palmer v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1972) 
(evidence of overpayment without more does not establish 
inference of intent to commit welfare fraud); People v. Crawford, 
422 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dept. 1979); Holmes v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 172, 179 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1993) (knowing 
conduct is voluntary and intentional conduct, not mistake, 
accident or some other innocent reason). 
The court in People v. Johnson, 259 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1965), 
reversed a conviction for welfare fraud for insufficient evidence 
where the defendant was overpaid welfare assistance as a result 
of earned income that she failed to report. The court found that 
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the state failed to prove the defendant deliberately concealed a 
material fact or obtained the assistance by means of a false 
statement or representation. Id. 
If the state's evidence in this case -- that Howard received 
benefits while she was employed, that the Department was unaware 
that she was employed, and that Howard's employment was not 
disclosed on the forms provided to the Department -- is 
sufficient to support a conviction, the mental culpability 
element of the offense, "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,11 
and with an illegal purpose, is effectively eliminated as an 
ingredient of the offense. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1203(3) 
and 76-8-1205 (1995). Since the Public Assistance Fraud Act 
requires the state to prove mental culpability, the conviction 
against Howard must be reversed. 
B. THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW THAT HOWARD WAS 
INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS. 
According to Section 76-8-1203, a recipient is in violation 
of the Public Assistance Fraud Act if he or she fails to make a 
disclosure that may materially affect "the determination of his 
eligibility." In this case, the state failed to present evidence 
going to the eligibility factor. 
While the state presented testimony from each case worker 
that the Department workers believed Howard was unemployed when 
they calculated the benefits she received, the state failed to 
show how eligibility was determined, how Howard's budget was 
established, and how it should have been adjusted to accommodate 
14 
reported wages. In addition, during trial the state's witness, 
Robert Riddle, testified that he entered various numbers into a 
computer and the computer calculated the benefits and an 
overpayment. (R. 489-91.) Riddle did not disclose how those 
numbers related to such things as eligibility or how the benefits 
were calculated. Without such information the jury could not 
have determined whether Howard was not entitled either to the 
benefits she received or some other amount in benefits. See 
People v. Dixon, 46 Cal.App.3d 431, 120 Cal.Rptr. 163 (2d Dist. 
1975) (evidence failed to establish that the defendant was 
ineligible for the benefits). Thus, the state failed to prove 
ineligibility. The conviction must be reversed on that basis. 
POINT II. THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION USED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS CONFUSING AND CIRCULAR, AND IT 
TRIVIALIZED THE BURDEN PLACED ON THE STATE. 
Howard's counsel proposed a reasonable doubt instruction 
that the trial court rejected. (R. 157-58.) Over Howard's 
objection (R. 533-535), the trial court submitted the following 
instruction to the jury: 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, 
are in favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed 
innocence until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an 
acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon 
the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does 
not require proof to an absolute certainty. Now by 
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on 
reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a 
doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on 
a wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
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reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which 
satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and 
obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, 
and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of the 
evidence in this case. 
(R. 96 (hereinafter the trial court's jury instruction is 
referred to as the "submitted instruction".) This Court has 
approved the use of an instruction identical to the submitted 
instruction. State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991); State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
reversed on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Maestas, 815 
P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1992); State v. 
Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Chavez, 
840 P.2d 846 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 
(Utah 1993). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
sufficiency of the submitted instruction, it has shown interest 
in general in reasonable doubt instructions. In State v. Young, 
853 P.2d 327, 346 (Utah 1993), the court found that a reasonable 
doubt instruction similar to the instruction proposed by Howard 
was sufficient. The court sanctioned the use of language that 
impressed upon the jury the heavy burden the prosecution must 
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meet to prove guilt: "You must have greater assurance of the 
correctness of such a decision than you would normally have in 
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life." (See R. 
157-58); Id. That language is set forth in Howard's instruction 
but did not occur in the submitted instruction. 
The court also approved that portion of the instruction, 
similar to the language in the instruction Howard proposed, that 
informed jurors they were to "base their deliberations on the 
evidence in the case and not to entertain imaginary or specula-
tive suggestions." Id.; but see State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1989) (the court in its supervisory capacity directed trial 
courts to discontinue use of the "more weighty affairs of life" 
language, and the "possible or imaginary" language). 
While the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have not condemned use of certain instructions, they have 
indicated an inclination to review reasonable doubt instructions 
with intense scrutiny, since use of certain words and phrases may 
violate the due process provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions.2 See Caere v. Lousiana, 489 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 
328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam) (the words "substantial" 
2
 The due process provisions of the federal constitution are 
embodied in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The fifth amendment 
provides in part: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." The fourteenth amendment 
states in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." Article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution is identical to the federal provisions. Howard is not 
asserting that a due process analysis under the Utah Constitution is 
different from an analysis under the federal constitution. See State v. 
Mace, 295 Adv. Rep. 44, 45 (Utah 1996). 
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and "grave" in an instruction may suggest a higher degree of 
doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt 
standard in violation of the due process clause); Victor v. 
Nebraska, 511 U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) 
(Court condemned use of the phrase "moral certainty" and "moral 
evidence" although it did not violate due process). 
Against that backdrop, the sentence from the submitted 
instruction, which reads: "Now by reasonable doubt is meant a 
doubt that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view 
of all the evidence," is circular and clarifies nothing. It is 
followed by the following sentence: "A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain." As 
Justice Ginsburg complained in Victor, "Jury comprehension is 
scarcely advanced when a court 'defines' reasonable doubt as 
'doubt . . . that is reasonable.'" 114 S.Ct. at 1252, 127 L.Ed. 
2d at 602 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Another sentence of the submitted instruction states: "It 
must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely 
fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility." Without more, that sentence is not helpful in 
defining what "reasonable doubt" is. Cf. Haston, 811 P.2d at 933 
n. 5 ("It is doubtful that an effort to define the reasonable 
doubt standard by telling a jury what it JLS not would be 
illuminating"). 
In total, after setting forth that the state must prove its 
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case beyond a reasonable doubt, the submitted instruction has 
five sentences stressing what reasonable doubt is not, and 
defining reasonable doubt in terms of "reason" and "reasonable" 
people, thereby confusing and trivializing the burden placed on 
the state. The submitted instruction also suggests to the jurors 
that they are being unreasonable if they have doubts. The 
submitted instruction trivializes the state's burden of proof in 
violation of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments of the federal constitution and article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. Deficient reasonable doubt 
instructions can never be harmless error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). 
On the other hand, the instruction proposed by Howard 
identifies what reasonable doubt is without defining that phrase 
in a circular fashion: 
In some circumstances, the mere possibility that 
the defendant did not commit the crime with which 
he/she is charged may create a reasonable doubt; 
however, any such possibility must be based upon reason 
and logic, and not upon a purely emotional urge or a 
wholly speculative possibility. 
. . . . A determination that a defendant has committed 
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the 
application of reason, impartiality and common sense. 
You must have greater assurance of the correctness of 
such a decision than you would normally have in 
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life. 
The reason for this standard is that you cannot undo 
your verdict once you have announced it. In your 
personal life, on the other hand, you may be able to 
undo or modify the consequences or decisions you make. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest 
standard of proof in the American system of justice; it 
is the standard that is always used in criminal cases, 
such as the case you will be deciding here. It is a 
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much higher standard of proof than the standards of 
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing 
evidence used in civil cases. If a scale were used to 
demonstrate the various standards of proof, with 
complete uncertainty at one end of the scale and 
absolute certainty at the other end, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt would be very close to the absolute 
certainty end of the scale. 
(R. 157-58.) Howard's case should be reversed and remanded for a 
new trial with a proper reasonable doubt instruction, as proposed 
by the defense in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the state failed to prove intentional, knowing, or 
reckless conduct, and illegal purpose, Howard respectfully 
requests the entry of an order reversing the conviction and 
dismissing the case. In the alternative, Howard requests an 
order reversing the conviction and remanding the case for a new 
trial with a proper reasonable doubt instruction. 
SUBMITTED this UJJL day of ^L^^c JU^i 1996. 
I/INDA M. JONES A 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Lisa J. Remal 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
hand-delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILED 
aKTQipT rniiRT IAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
" ^ ^ T f f i & M H i T \ 
SA'u'LAi.: J-^STY 
EY. 
DEPUTY CLERK 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
vs. 
~7>777 /TIC/} ^D W ft&b 
bob. H-/&-S1 
Defendant. 
Case No. *TmO/£*Tt 
Count No. , 
Honorable L<}///#>^ (*>,e>nhi/ 
Clerk /fr &bo*>4-x 
Reporter K SrLu/t-z. 
Bailiff *3 fam~*^-^ 
D a t e _ ^ W Z ^ 
^ 
- ^ 2)' / z / ^ 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by S a jury; D the court; • plea of guilty; 
D plea of no,contest; of the offense of l(}££f#t& ffctolft , a felony 
^ i Jegree, • a class of the. 
represented by. 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
_ and the State being represented by , is now adjudged guilty 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
H. of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, • Court, Count(s) 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
B Defendant is granted a stay of the above (ia prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of _3V6/te^ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
B~ Commitment shall issue f* firMH <# Jfijp ffi ft ' <T» fl.m 
DATED this Z 2 - day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
p. { c\ "' h 
Deputy County Attorney Page of Z 
Judgment/State v ~TkhlW&- pfrv*szQ 7CR /Honorable UjiVuhn t&ohl n\ 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
taf Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept of Adult Probation & Parole 
% Serve f /)#^S 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing h/trzOU. A. flf£ (^ tflfd A-l-
Q Pay a fine in the amount of $ 
Parole, or D at the rate of 
. • at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
S^Pay restitution in the amount of $ ^ LQiivDr • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole D at a rate of , or El at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
• Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
• Participate in and complete any • educational, and/or • vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole, or D with 
• Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole, or D with 
• Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs 
D Submit to drug testing 
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally 
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use 
• Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
• Obtain and maintain full-time employment 
D Maintain full-time employment 
• Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling 
& Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole „ 
R Complete ^COhnur^ of community service restitution in lieu of /-/M6 
D Defendant is to commit no crimes 
• Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on 
Q T^Jl^st**^^ / s t\rzC£foo fa fPfrn &.f*c*^\mi^t- \£g* 0 /So ' °~ ~ip C-t 
JRL ZVfi/>)/)/TK/- n^f- (^ /9-//no&€> f-a ° rt^i^ixi J^OAI^ &$/*.%< whctf fonZ* 
. for a review of this sentence 
& /So •** td b/9 
• 
U.JP Dn ZVU? b/cy-f-i tf\\ - £ w 4 
• 
L<A\M ?*»*}r. 
DATED this f7- day of fzkrfU+y 
Page ^~ of ^-L 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
LISA J. REMAL (2722) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AMENDED JUDGMENT, 
SENTENCE (COMMITMENT) 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
TAMARA HOWARD, : Case No. 951901594FS 
JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Defendant. : 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sentence in the above-
entitled case be amended as follows: 
The above-named defendant, Tamara Howard, shall serve 8 
(eight) days of jail as a condition of her sentence, in lieu of the 
previous order of 9 (nine) days of jail. 
All other conditions of the defendant's sentence as 
contained in the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) dated February 12, 
1996 shall remain in effect. 
DATED this ( day of March, 1996. 
MAR 0 7 1996 
CC'-HX 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to MARK BAER at 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 
East 300 South, Sixth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 this ± 
day of March, 1996. 
TfarA.tLJ 
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ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant is presumed innocent unless the defendant is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is a 
reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. It is 
the State's responsibility to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The State's evidence must eliminate all 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does 
not require proof to an absolute certainty. 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and 
women would entertain, and it must be based on the evidence or the 
lack of evidence in the case. In some circumstances, the mere 
possibility that the defendant did not commit the crime with which 
he/she is charged may create a reasonable doubt; however, any such 
possibility must be based upon reason and logic, and not upon a 
purely emotional urge or a wholly speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who 
are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and eliminates all 
reasonable doubt. A determination that a defendant has committed 
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of 
reason, impartiality and common sense. You must have greater 
assurance of the correctness of such a decision than you would 
normally have in reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own 
life. The reason for this standard is that you cannot undo your 
verdict once you have announced it. In your personal life, on the 
other hand, you may be able to undo or modify the consequences or 
decisions you make. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard 
of proof in the American system of justice; it is the standard that 
is always used in criminal cases, such as the case you will be 
deciding here. It is a much higher standard of proof than the 
standards of preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing 
evidence used in civil cases. If a scale were used to demonstrate 
the various standards of proof, with complete uncertainty at one 
end of the scale and absolute certainty at the other end, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt would be very close to the absolute 
certainty end of the scale. 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR ™ 55SJ5? 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH N0V 3 ° 1995 
Deputy Cferk 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TAMARA HOWARD, 
Defendant 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
CASE NO: 951901594 
THE JURY IS HEREBY CHARGED WITH THE LAW THAT 
APPLIES TO THIS CASE IN THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS, 
NUMBERED ([ ) THROUGH ££), INCLUSIVE. 
Dated this 2& day of November . 1995. 
COURT: 
WILLIAM B. BO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CP.CRI 
n r l\ rt C S\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. J 
Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your attention during 
this trial. I will now explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and 
apply in deciding this case. When I have finished you will go to the jury room 
and begin your discussions, what we call your deliberations. Please pay 
attention to the legal instructions I am about to give you. This is an extremely 
important part of this trial. 
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but 
must consider the instructions as a whole. The order in which the instructions 
are given has no significance as to their relative importance. If a direction or 
an idea is stated more than once, or in varying ways, no emphasis is intended 
and none must be inferred by you. 
l.CRI 
INSTRUCTION NO. £L 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are presented by 
the allegations in the Information filed in this court and the defendant's plea 
of "not guilty." This duty you should perform uninfluenced by pity for the 
defendant or by passion or prejudice against him. You must not suffer 
yourselves to be biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has 
been arrested for this offense, or because he has been brought before the court 
to stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you are not 
permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them that he is more 
likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and 
the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be governed by mere 
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public 
feeling. Both the State of Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and 
they do demand and expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately 
consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will 
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may 
be. The verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror. 
2S.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant, Tamara Howard, is accused in an Information 
filed with this Court by the Attorney General of the State of Utah 
of having committed the crime of "Welfare Fraud," a felony of the 
Second Degree, in violation of Section 62A-9-13 0, Utah Code 
Annotated. The essential allegations of the Information are as 
follows: 
That on or between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Tamara Howard, as a 
party to the offense, did intentionally, or knowingly by false 
statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent 
means, failed to disclose any material fact or change in 
circumstances for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive 
public assistance to which he was not entitled, or in an amount 
larger than that to which he was entitled and the value of benefits 
fraudulently obtained exceeded $5,000. 
INSTRUCTION NO .A 
Instruction No. 3 is not to be considered by you as a statement of the 
facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded by you merely as a summarized 
statement of the allegations of the Information. The mere fact that the 
defendant stands charged with an offense is not to be taken by you as any 
evidence of his guilt. 
4S.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. O 
You are instructed that to the Information the defendant has entered a 
plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies each and all of the essential 
allegations of the charge contained in the Information and casts upon the 
State the burden of proving each and all of the essential allegations thereof to 
your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
5S.CRI 
flOA^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. (o 
You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been 
charged with this offense and has been held to answer to the charge by a 
committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his guilt and is not even a 
circumstance which should be considered by you in determining his guilt or 
innocence. 
6S.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of 
innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not require proof to an absolute certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is 
meant a doubt that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the 
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must 
arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
8S.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called upon to 
determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be admitted. You 
are not to be concerned with the reasons for such rulings and are not to draw 
any inferences from them. Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a 
question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the 
court does not determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor does 
it pass on the credibility of the witness. You are not to consider evidence 
offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any 
question to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to 
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
9.CR1 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of justice, 
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether 
favorable to the State or to the defendant, provided, however,that to support 
a verdict of guilt the evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a 
combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. 
The law makes no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof 
required for conviction or as to their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but 
respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of 
the testimony of every witness who, with any of his own physical senses, 
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or 
relates what thus was perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is 
circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, 
statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by 
reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it may be 
considered by you in arriving at a verdict. 
10.CR1 
0 0 0 r- 9 c> 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile such 
conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict cannot be 
reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine from the evidence 
what the facts are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall 
determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall 
determine what the facts in this case are. But you should carefully and 
conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimony, and all of the facts 
and circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine 
therefrom what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all that the 
witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of witnesses unless such 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and 
circumstances in evidence. You may believe one witness as against many, or 
many as against a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions. 
The testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on one matter 
is naturally less convincing on other matters. So if you believe a witness has 
wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact in this case, you may disregard 
the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight as 
you think it is entitled to. 
ll.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. N 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility 
of the witnesses you have a right to take into consideration their bias, their 
interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to 
testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' deportment 
upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent 
frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability 
to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should consider these 
matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you may 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' 
statement. 
12.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. l £ 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness in the 
defendant's own behalf and the defendant's testimony should be received and 
given the same consideration as you give to that of any other witness. The 
fact that the defendant stands accused of a crime is no evidence of defendant's 
guilt and is no reason for rejecting defendant's testimony. However, you 
should weigh the defendant's testimony the same as you weigh the testimony 
of any other witness. 
13S.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 J 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of 
a witness to be received as evidence. An exception to this rule 
exists in the case of a witness who, by education, study and 
experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession. 
Such a witness may give his opinion on any matter in which he has 
been deemed to be an expert and which is material to the case. You 
should consider such expert opinion and the basis and reasons, if 
any, given for it, and then give it the weight to which you feel it 
is entitled. You are not bound by such an opinion and you may 
reject it, if in your judgment, the basis and reasons given for it 
are unsound. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 1 
Before you can convict the defendant, Tamara Howard, of 
the crime of Welfare Fraud, a Second Degree felony, you must find 
that the State has proven each of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
1. On or between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994, 
the defendant, Tamara Howard, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
2. knowingly or intentionally by false statement, 
misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent means; 
3. failed to disclose any material fact or change in 
circumstances; 
4. for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive 
public assistance to which she was not entitled, or in an amount 
larger than that to which she was entitled; 
5. and the value of benefits fraudulently obtained 
exceeded $5,000.00. 
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish 
each of the these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. If you find that the evidence has 
established each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
o o o i o r-
INSTRUCTION NO. \<? 
In the alternative, you can convict the defendant Tamara 
Howard of Attempted Welfare Fraud. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Tamara Howard, of the 
lesser included crime of Attempted Welfare Fraud, a Third Degree 
Felony, you must find that the State has proven that the defendant, 
acting with the culpability otherwise required for the commission 
of the offense of Welfare Fraud, engaged in conduct consisting of 
a substantial step toward the commission of the offense of Welfare 
Fraud. You must find that the State has proven that the defendant 
did so attempt to commit Welfare Fraud with respect to each of the 
elements of Welfare Fraud as enumerated in Instruction No. 14 
For purposes of the offense of Attempted Welfare Fraud, 
conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the defendant's intent to commit the 
offense. 
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish each of 
the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. If you find that the evidence has established each of 
the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. I Jo 
Our State Legislature has provided in our criminal code as it 
applies to this case that no person is guilty of an offense unless 
her conduct is prohibited by law and that person acts intentionally 
or knowingly with respect to each element of the offense. 
It is thus apparent that the law requires a culpable mental 
state and to determine whether a person acts with the required 
mental intent requires a jury to examine and consider the actor's 
conduct. In doing so you must consider the nature of one's 
conduct, the circumstances surrounding her conduct and the result 
of her conduct. 
Considering these factors, our law states that a person 
engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect 
to the nature of her conduct or to a result of her conduct, when it 
is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to her conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding her conduct when she is aware of 
the nature of her conduct or the existing circumstances. A person 
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of her 
conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ( H 
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting 
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission 
of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward the commission of the offense. Conduct only 
constitutes a substantial step if there is evidence which strongly 
corroborates the defendant's intent to commit the offense of 
welfare fraud. 
In this case, the defendant Tamara Howard, can be found to 
have committed the lesser included offense of Attempted Welfare 
Fraud if you find that on or between January 1, 1994 and December 
31, 1994r in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Tamara 
Howard, as a party to the offense, intentionally or knowingly, by 
false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other 
fraudulent means, failed to disclose any material fact or change in 
circumstances for the purpose of attempting to obtain or attempting 
to continue to receive public assistance to which he was not 
entitled, or in an amount larger than that to which he was entitled 
and the value of benefits fraudulently obtained or attempted to be 
obtained exceeded $5,000. 
Pr P ^ -8 f /* 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1U 
You are instructed that a paid state warrant or check made to 
the order of the defendant, is sufficient to establish that the 
defendant received public assistance in the amount of the warrant 
or check. Such evidence may be rebutted or contradicted, but in 
the absence of evidence to rebut or contradict it, the warrant or 
check will suffice as proof that the defendant received the 
assistance. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or 
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a 
defense for that crime. 
Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if she commits an act 
or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the 
existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would 
make such act or omission lawful. 
o o o l o * 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In determining any fact in this case you should not consider nor be 
influenced by any statement made or act done by the court which you may 
interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are the sole and final judges of 
all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions 
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe the court 
thinks thereon. The court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be 
understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, 
or what are or what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what 
the court thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and not be 
influenced by the views of the court. 
16.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 1 
The lawyers, like you and myself, are officers of this Court. It is the duty 
of each of them to present the evidence on behalf of the client and to make 
such objections as he or she deems proper and to argue fully the client's cause. 
You should, however, bear in mind that each of the lawyers is here in a 
partisan capacity, and it is both their duty and responsibility to be advocates 
of the position he or she claims for the client. If during the trial or in their 
closing arguments, the lawyers have made statements concerning the evidence 
which do not conform with your recollection of it, you should disregard the 
lawyers' statements and rely solely on your own recollection of the evidence. 
If either lawyer's argument includes statements of the law which differ from 
the law which I have given you, you should disregard such statements and rely 
entirely on the law as given to you by the Court. 
17S.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss or consider the 
subject of penalty or punishment. That is a matter which lies with the Court 
and other governmental agencies, and must not in any way affect your decision 
as to the innocence or guilt of a defendant. 
18.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules 
of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. 
The applicability of some of these instructions will depend upon the 
conclusions you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the 
fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the 
court and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If 
an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does not exist, you 
will disregard the instruction. 
19.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Q^ 
The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the individual 
opinion of each juror. It is the duty of each of you after considering all the 
evidence in the case, to determine, if possible, the question of guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. When you have reached a conclusion in that 
respect, you should not change it merely because one or more or all of the 
other jurors may have come to a different conclusion. However, each juror 
should freely and fairly discuss with the other jurors the evidence and the 
deductions to be drawn from the evidence. If, after doing so, any juror 
should be satisfied that a conclusion the juror first reached was wrong, the 
juror unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render the 
juror's verdict according to the juror's final decision. 
20S.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their deliberations 
are a matter of considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for 
a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of the 
juror's opinion on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a 
certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, the juror's sense of pride 
may be aroused, and the juror may hesitate to recede from an announced 
position if shown that it is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans 
or advocates in this matter, but are judges. The final test of the quality of 
your service will lie in the verdict which you return to the court, not in the 
opinions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in mind that you will make 
a definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a 
just and proper verdict. To that end, the court would remind you that in 
your deliberations in the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration of justice 
based on such declaration. 
21.CRI 
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INSTRUCTION NO. & 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will 
preside over your deliberations. Your verdict in this case on the 
charge of Welfare Fraud, must be either: 
1. Guilty of Welfare Fraud, a Second Degree Felony, 
or; 
or; 
Guilty of Attempted Welfare Fraud, a Third Degree Felony, 
3. Not Guilty of Welfare Fraud or Attempted Welfare Fraud. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. A written form for each of 
the above-mentioned possible verdicts will be furnished to you. 
When your verdict has been found, the appropriate form or forms 
must be signed and dated by your foreperson and then returned by 
you to this court. When your verdict has been found, notify the 
Bailiff that you are ready to report to the court. 
DATED this day of November , 199JL 
( IVT^k 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM D 
PART 12 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD 
76-8-1201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Overpayment" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
62A-9-129. 
(2) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
62A-11-103. 
(3) "Public assistance" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 62A-11-103. 
(4) "Recipient" means a person who receives or has received public 
assistance. 
History: C. 1953,76-8-1201, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, 
1994, ch. 122, § 8. § 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Welfare Laws public welfare benefits, 22 A.L.R.4th 534. 
§§ 111 to 113. Liability of state or federal government for 
AJLR. — Criminal liability under state laws losses associated with distribution of food 
in connection with application for, or receipt of, stamps, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 457. 
76-8-1202. Application of part. 
(1) This part does not apply to offenses by providers under the state's 
Medicaid program that are actionable under Title 26, Chapter 20, False Claims 
Act. 
(2) (a) Section 62A-9-131 applies to criminal actions taken under this part, 
(b) The repayment of funds or other benefits obtained in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter shall not constitute a defense or grounds for 
dismissal of a criminal action. 
History: C. 1953,76-8-1202, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, 
1994, ch. 122, § 9. § 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994. 
76-8-1203. Disclosure required — Penalty, 
(1) Each person who applies for public assistance shall disclose to the 
Department of Human Services each fact that may materially affect the 
determination of his eligibility to receive public assistance, including his 
current: 
(a) marital status; 
(b) household composition; 
(c) employment; 
(d) income; 
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind gifts; and 
(f) other resources. 
(2) Any person applying for public assistance who intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly fails to disclose any material fact required to be disclosed under 
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose 
to the Department of Human Services any change in a material fact required 
to be disclosed under Subsection (1), within ten days after the date of the 
change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that failure to disclose results in 
an overpayment. 
History: C. 1953,76-8-1203, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, 
1994, ch. 122, § 10. § 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994. 
76-8-1204. Disclosure by provider required — Penalty. 
(1) (a) Any provider who solicits, requests, or receives, actually or construc-
tively, any payment or contribution through a payment, assessment, gift, 
devise, bequest, or other means, directly or indirectly, from a recipient or 
recipient's family shall notify the Department of Human Services of the 
amount of payment or contribution in writing within ten days after 
receiving that payment or contribution. 
(b) If the payment or contribution is to be made under an agreement, 
written or oral, the provider shall notify the Department of Human 
Services of the payment or contribution within ten days after entering into 
the agreement. 
(2) Any person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to notify the 
Department of Human Services as required by this section is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953,76-8-1204, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, 
1994, ch. 122, § 11. § 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994. 
76-8-1205. Public assistance fraud defined. 
Each of the following persons, who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
commits any of the following acts, is guilty of public assistance fraud: 
(1) any person who uses, transfers, acquires, traffics in, falsifies, or 
possesses any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate of 
eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, or public 
assistance warrant in a manner not allowed by law; 
(2) any person who fraudulently misappropriates any funds exchanged 
for food stamps, any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate 
of eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, or other 
public assistance with which he has been entrusted or that has come into 
his possession in connection with his duties in administering any state or 
federally funded public assistance program; 
(3) any person who receives an unauthorized payment as a result of acts 
described in this section; 
(4) any provider who receives payment or any recipient who receives 
benefits after failing to comply with any applicable requirement in 
Sections 76-8-1203 and 76-8-1204; 
(5) any provider who files a claim for payment under any state or 
federally fiinded public assistance program for goods or services not 
provided to or for a recipient of that program; 
(6) any provider who files or falsifies a claim, report, or document 
required by state or federal law, rule, or provider agreement for goods or 
services not authorized under the state or federally funded public assis-
tance program for which the goods or services were provided; 
(7) any provider who fails to credit the state for payments received from 
other sources; 
(8) any provider who bills a recipient or a recipient's family for goods or 
services not provided, or bills in an amount greater than allowed by law or 
rule; 
(9) any recipient who, while receiving public assistance, acquires in-
come or resources in excess of the amount he previously reported to the 
Department of Human Services, and fails to notify the department within 
ten days after acquiring the excess income or resources; 
(10) any person who fails to act as required under Section 76-8-1203 or 
76-8-1204 with intent to obtain or help another obtain an "overpayment* 
as defined in Section 62A-9-129; and 
(11) any person who obtains an overpayment by violation of Section 
76-8-1203 or 76-8-1204. 
History: C. 1953,76-8-1205, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, 
1994, ch. 122, § 12. § 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994. 
76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud. 
(1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in 
accordance with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received, 
misappropriated, claimed, or applied for as follows: 
(a) second degree felony if the value exceeds $1,000; 
(b) third degree felony if the value exceeds $250 or is up to $1,000; 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value exceeds $100 or is up to $250; and 
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value is $100 or less. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by 
aggregating the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed 
by the defendant as part of the same facts and circumstances or a related series 
of facts and circumstances. 
(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month 
period, committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a 
related series of facts and circumstances regardless of whether the transac-
tions are conducted with a variety of unrelated parties. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1206, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, 
1994, ch. 122, § 13. § 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994. 
76-8-1207. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits 
— Repayment no defense to criminal action. 
In any criminal action pursuant to this part: 
(1) a paid state warrant made to the order of a party constitutes prima 
facie evidence that the party received financial assistance from the state; 
(2) all of the records in the custody of the department relating to the 
application for, verification of, issuance of, receipt of, and use of public 
assistance constitute records of regularly conducted activity within the 
meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence; 
(3) the value of the benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or 
usual charge for similar benefits in the private sector; and 
(4) the repayment of funds or other benefits obtained in violation of the 
provisions of this part constitutes no defense to, or ground for dismissal of, 
that action. 
History: C. 1953,76-8-1207, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 102, § 1. Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 102 
PART 12 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD 
76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud. 
(1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in 
accordance with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received, 
misappropriated, claimed, or applied for as follows: 
(a) second degree felony if the value is or exceeds $5,000; 
(b) third degree felony if the value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value is or exceeds $300 but is less than 
$1,000; and 
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value is less than $300. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by 
aggregating the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed 
by the defendant as part of the same facts and circumstances or a related series 
of facts and circumstances. 
(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month 
period, committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a 
related series of facts and circumstances regardless of whether the transac-
tions are conducted with a variety of unrelated parties. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1206, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, increased the 
1994, ch. 122, 9 13; 1995, ch. 291, § 22. value amounts in Subsections (lXa) through 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- (d). 
Art I CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
